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The Use of Deception in Public Health
Behavioral Intervention Trials: A Case
Study of Three Online Alcohol Trials
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Kypros Kypri, University of Newcastle
Preben Bendtsen, Linko¨ping University
John Porter, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Some public health behavioral intervention research studies involve deception. Amethodological imperative to minimize bias can be in conflict with the ethical principle
of informed consent. As a case study, we examine the specific forms of deception used in three online randomized controlled trials evaluating brief alcohol interventions.
We elaborate our own decision making about the use of deception in these trials, and present our ongoing findings and uncertainties. We discuss the value of the
approach of pragmatism for examining these kinds of ethical issues that can arise in research on public health interventions.
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The authors are public health researchers. This article de-
scribes our efforts over a period of some years to address
a set of long-standing methodological and ethical issues in
the field of brief alcohol intervention research. Brief inter-
ventions are simply conversations or other interactions that
help people reflect on a particular issue, such as alcohol
consumption and its consequences, and whether and how
people might change (Heather 2010). We have deployed a
number of novel designs for behavioral studies being con-
ducted on the Internet to addressmethodological problems,
employing deception in so doing. We use three ongoing
randomized controlled trials as a case study in which we
present our analysis of the ethical issues. Because the issues
raised are relevant to health behavior research and public
health more widely, we begin by presenting these broader
contexts. We have linked our decisionmaking in these trials
to available guidance and literature and include our reflec-
tions on the approach of pragmatism and the related need
for empirical data to inform ethical evaluations.
BACKGROUND
Deception in Research
Deception is a word in common use, defined as “a mis-
leading falsehood” (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/
deception). It may be practiced in ways that generate
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harms—for example, obtaining money under false pre-
tences may cause victims various forms of suffering. In the
context of research, Wendler and Miller (2004) have sug-
gested: “Deception occurs when investigators intentionally
communicate in a way that produces false beliefs . . . inves-
tigators may deceive subjects by intentionally giving them
false information . . . by intentionallywith-holding informa-
tion in order to produce false beliefs” (47). Giving mislead-
ing information may be more deceptive than withholding
information and allowing participants to form false beliefs
(Wendler and Miller 2004). Deception may also infringe on
rights that are widely acknowledged; for example, decep-
tion is usually precluded in clinical research by the Helsinki
Declaration requirement for informed consent to be given
by all capable participants. Clause 24 states that “each po-
tential subject must be adequately informed of the aims,
methods . . . anticipated benefits and potential risks of the
study” (World Medical Association 2008).
Deception has long been used in research. In the
Tuskegee study and the Milgram experiments the use of
deception was one of many issues in these studies that
have attracted wide attention in the bioethics literature
(Cave and Holm 2003). In a landmark study published in
the journal Science, Rosenhan (1973) had pseudo-patients
feign hearing voices in order to be admitted to psychiatric
hospitals and thereafter behave normally. While providing
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valuable information about psychiatric diagnosis and treat-
ment in asylums (Bulmer 1982) this study was fiercely crit-
icized as unscientific (Spitzer 1975). Before the Rosenhan
study, there had been long-standing discussions among so-
cial scientists about the ethics of covert observation, and
these included studies in health care contexts (Bulmer 1982).
Deception in research has often provoked controversy. The
Tearoom Trade study by Laud Humphreys, for example,
involved a researcher providing false information about
the researcher’s identity and purposes in order to find out
aboutmenhaving sex together inpublic rest rooms, generat-
ing considerablemethodological and ethical debates (Lenza
2004). Mystery clients are still used in sexual health be-
havior research (Wong et al. 2012) and health care research
(Kirschner et al. 2010) today.
Deception is widely practiced within experimental so-
cial psychology, particularly so in laboratory settings, most
oftenwith psychology students (Miller, Gluck, andWendler
2008; Wendler and Miller 2004). Fisher and Fyrberg (1994)
reviewed 30 years of this tradition of study, with approxi-
mately half of all social psychology studies conducted until
the early 1980s involving deception. A partial replication of
theMilgramexperiment has beenmore recently undertaken
(Burger 2009), and highly complex forms of deception have
evolved to preserve experimental manipulations from bias
(Laney et al. 2008).
Deception in the psychology laboratory with relatively
small numbers of participants may pose ethical dilemmas
very different from those that arise in the less constrained
contexts of studies involving larger numbers of people in
other settings. For example, concern has been articulated
that the harms potentially caused by deception in clinical
contextsmay include impairment of trust that patients have
in health care staff, potentially leading to poorer health out-
comes (Wendler and Miller 2004). Similarly, attempts to in-
fluence behaviors under the autonomous control of research
participants in their own lives are different in nature from
experimental manipulations of the performance of behav-
iors in laboratory contexts.
The 1979 Belmont Report and the consequent develop-
ment of institutional review boards limited the widespread
useofdeception inhealth, psychological, and social research
(Rosnow and Rosenthal 1997). Since then, whether a partic-
ular study should be allowed to use deception is amatter for
institutional review boards and guidance is available on the
circumstances in which informed consent may be waived
(Office for Human Research Protections 1993), as well as in
many professional ethical codes in different countries.
Public Health and Public Health Ethics
Public health is concerned with creating the conditions in
which people can be healthy (Childress et al. 2002). It in-
creasingly pays attention to lifestyle in relation to the causes,
prevention, treatment, and management of health and dis-
ease (NuffieldCouncil onBioethics 2007). There is particular
interest in better understanding how people can be helped
to protect and enhance their health and well-being by in-
creasing health-promoting behaviors and reducing health-
compromising behaviors. There are many ethical issues at-
tendant upon these efforts to influence behavior (Marteau,
Oliver, and Ashcroft 2008). For instance, we obviously in-
tervene more with some behaviors, such as drug use, and
in some populations, for example, among the poor, in ways
not obviously justified in health terms. The intervention it-
self may also raise ethical issues (Marteau, Ashcroft, and
Oliver 2009); for instance, should we pay pregnant smokers
to stop smoking? Although widely accepted as the ethical
foundation of human health research, the Helsinki Declara-
tion has also been criticized for providing an individualistic
approach (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007; Buchanan
and Miller 2006). It has evolved over time and since 2000
has included a specific responsibility for health research to
deliver benefits to populations (Williams 2008). Dedicated
frameworks formoral reasoning in public health ethics have
also been developed (e.g., Kass 2001; Childress et al. 2002).
These do not provide specific guidance on research ethics
in the context of public health.
More rigorous research studies provide more accurate
estimates of intervention effects for decision making, and
are thus more ethical to the extent that this information will
be used effectively and fairly to improve population health
(Kass 2001). The Cochrane Collaboration (Higgins et al.
2011) recommends the use of blinding to prevent bias in
randomized controlled trials on the basis of empirical evi-
dence of bias in unblinded trials. According to Boutron and
colleagues (2007): “Blinding refers to keeping key persons,
such as participants, health care providers, and outcome
assessors, unaware of the treatment administered or of the
true hypothesis of the trial” (0371). In certain circumstances
participants may be blinded to study participation itself,
or to the purposes of the study, or to particular features of
the study design, including details of interventions being
evaluated, being randomized, or outcome data collection
(Boutron et al. 2007). Deception may occur in blinding in
certain circumstances (Carson et al. 2008), though study
participants may also give consent to be blinded, as occurs,
for example, in placebo-controlled drug trials.
Where blinding does involve deception, that is, research
participants being given false information or led by omis-
sions to hold false beliefs, the methodological imperative to
constrain bias to produce socially useful research appears
to be in conflict with the ethical imperative of informed con-
sent, as enshrined in the Helsinki Declaration. This conflict
brings together perhaps the two dominant perspectives in
research ethics (Rachels 1999). On the one hand there are
arguments based on a Kantian emphasis on respect for the
autonomy of the individual research participant. Using re-
search participants as means to an end should in all circum-
stances be avoided as a categorical imperative. On the other
hand, various versions of utilitarianism promote the pur-
suit of the greatest good for society as a whole, thus taking
account of wider interests beyond those directly pertain-
ing to research participants themselves (Rachels 1999). This
balancing of concern for individual rights with governmen-
tal responsibilities to protect and promote health has been
described as the “central ethical dilemma” in public health
(Krebs 2008).
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CASE STUDY
Introduction to the Study Context and the Nature of
the Research Problems Addressed
Alcohol is a drug whose use has been estimated to cause
approximately 5.5% of the global burden of disease (Lim
et al. 2012), as well as a range of social and economic harms
(Rehm et al. 2009). Drinking more alcohol than is prob-
ably good for one’s health is very common, and there is
a global consensus that brief interventions should be of-
fered opportunistically to people whose drinking is identi-
fied as risky, rather than simply targeting those who seek
help (Room, Babor, and Rehm 2005). In brief intervention
trials it has been found that there is much change over time
among participants randomized to control conditions who
are not seeking help and not receiving interventions (Jenk-
ins, McAlaney, and McCambridge 2009; 2010). This may be
a consequence of research participation itself, as well as be-
ing due to natural variability in the behavior over time and
regression to the mean, as determination of eligibility usu-
ally requires selection. A systematic review of randomized
comparisons within brief intervention trials indicates that
simply answering questions about alcohol consumption can
produce small effects on people’s behavior, at least in some
populations (McCambridge and Kypri 2011).
The challenge for researchers in this area is to separate
any effects of taking part in research studies from the effects
of the interventions being evaluated, which are also small.
Public health improvement increasingly involves attention
to securing small changes in lifestyle as widely as possible.
Both assessment effects and brief interventions probably in-
fluence behavior in similarways, getting people to reflect on
howmuch they are drinking and whether this is acceptable
to them (Clifford and Maisto 2000). These methodological
challenges stemming from research participation itself ex-
tend well beyond alcohol and have been recognized and
studied in relation to a range of other behaviors, includ-
ing diet and sexual health (see McCambridge et al. 2011;
McCambridge, De Bruin, and Witton 2012).
Brief intervention trials have been undertaken for more
than a quarter of a century using deception. The oldest,
largest, and most influential studies internationally have
done so, including, for example, Chick, Lloud, andCrombie
(1985), Wallace, Cutler, and Haines (1988), WHO Brief In-
tervention StudyGroup (1996), and Fleming and colleagues
(1997). Most commonly this has taken the form of using a
formal consent procedure that does not disclose the study
focus on alcohol consumption, leading participants to be-
lieve that the study is concerned with health or lifestyle
more broadly. Preceding one of these studies, there was an
evaluation of the effects of deception in a small sample of
54 participants (Fleming et al. 1989). This identified some
evidence of discomfort and ambivalence, though at levels
deemed acceptable for the subsequent conduct of the trial.
Brief alcohol interventions, as with health care itself
(Barchard andWilliams 2008; Sharkey et al. 2011;Whitehead
2007), are increasingly being delivered and evaluated using
the Internet (e.g., Linke et al. 2008). Deception in Internet-
based research may be more easily implemented with com-
puterized automation of procedures. As there is also a range
of other distinct ethical issues raised in online research, ded-
icated guidance has been produced (Barchard andWilliams
2008; British Psychological Society 2007). Justifications sim-
ilar to those used in conventional research settings with
regard to the use of deception are advanced. For example:
“There must be a clear and convincing argument for the use
of deception online, which is only condoned if the research
question can be seen to justify it. . . . Strong justification is
needed if the research involves deliberate misrepresenta-
tion by a researcher” (British Psychological Society 2007).
Barchard and Williams (2008), applying the American Psy-
chologicalAssociation ethics code to this area, disagreewith
those who suggest that deception should not be used online
and additionally recommend that debriefing be used in all
online studies.
Case Study Material
Case studies investigate phenomena within their own real
life setting (Sarantakos 2005). Our case study sits some-
where close to the intersection of thinking about clinical
and public health research ethics, as it involves evaluating
interventions to alter individual behavior for the purpose
of improving population health. For all three studies con-
sidered here, trial protocols have been published wherein
more detailed information on study design is available:
Study A (The Electronic Screening and Brief Intervention
in New Zealand (e-SBINZ) trials; Kypri et al. 2010); Study B
(TheAlcohol e-MailAssessment& feedback study:Disman-
tling Effectiveness for University Students (AMADEUS-1)
trial; McCambridge, Bendtsen, et al. 2012); and Study C (a
methodological study entitled “The Effects of Study Design
and Allocation (ESDA) trial”; Kypri et al. 2011).
These studies have common features. They all involve
thousands of university students receiving an e-mail, and
studyparticipation is triggered by responding to this e-mail.
The burden of participation in time is small, taking notmore
than a few minutes at each contact, and much less than
1 hour in total. What is involved in each contact is answer-
ing some questions about personal alcohol consumption,
and in some cases receiving brief feedback. Two studies (A
and B) investigate the effects of feedback on subsequent
drinking behavior (Kypri et al. 2010; McCambridge, Bendt-
sen, et al. 2012). Study B additionally examines the effects
of answering questions alone in a three-arm trial. Study C
is a methodological study designed to investigate the ef-
fects of study design, randomizing participants into three
groups. One group is given to understand its members are
participating in a cohort study. The other two groups are
told that they are participating in a randomized controlled
trial, having been allocated to either the intervention or con-
trol conditions, respectively (Kypri et al. 2011). However, all
three groups receive the same alcohol information, which is
not expected to promote behavior change.
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The Content of the Deceptions and Reasons for Their
Use
There are various forms of deception used in each of the
studies. In some cases, the same deception is apparent in all
three studies, whereas other deceptions happen in only one
or two studies. Given next is an overviewof the nature of the
deceptions being used and the reasons for their use (issues
relating to debriefing are addressed in a later section).
• In all three studies the true purpose of the research is
withheld from participants (Studies A, B, and C).
• It is not clear to participants that their individual behavior
is being tracked over time in Study B.
• Where participants are aware of being individually fol-
lowedup, they are given false information aboutwhy this
is happening in Study C.
• In Studies A and B, participants are unaware they are
participating in a randomized controlled trial, as are those
in one of the three groups in Study C.
• In Study A those randomized to intervention are not
made aware that they are receiving of an intervention be-
ing evaluated for capacity to change their behavior (i.e.,
feedback), believing instead they are participating in a
survey.
• In Study B participants are not aware they are involved
in research at all when they access interventions.
• In Study C those randomized to intervention are led to
believe that they are receiving a potentially effective in-
tervention when they are not.
The core rationale for employing deception in these
studies is the same in all three cases: Communicating the
true nature of the study in advance would interfere with
the achievement of study aims. Participation rates would
be adversely affected in both intervention studies (A and
B) (Kypri et al. 2010; McCambridge, Bendtsen, et al. 2012),
and participation itself is an object of study.Wewant to find
ways to reach asmuch of the population as possiblewithout
the research context obstructing their willingness to take up
these offers. Failure to achieve high uptake has implications
for the generalizability of the intervention effect estimates.
Study B (McCambridge, Bendtsen, et al. 2012) was under-
taken in Sweden, where sending an e-mail to university
students was adopted as routine practice nationally before
this study took place and we were particularly interested
in which components (i.e., whether it was answering ques-
tions or the feedback) were responsible for any reported
change (McCambridge, Bendtsen, et al. 2012). Study A, the
New Zealand intervention study, has now led to the devel-
opment of a similar national system for offering this service
modeled on the intervention approach used in this study
(Kypri et al. 2013). In study C, the effects of awareness of the
nature of the study (i.e., the actual study design, whether
cohort or trial) and participant role in the trial (i.e., inter-
vention or control) are precisely what is being investigated
in this methodological study. This allows consideration of
whether the usual processes of informed consent and trial
recruitment induce self-reported behavior change (Kypri
et al. 2011). We have sought to design the research process
as far as possible in the intervention studies to minimize
the risk that participants’ behavior will be affected by the
research process itself.
OUR APPROACH TO THE ETHICAL ISSUES
We could not find a framework dedicated to public health
research ethics, never mind one that was concerned with
our more specific interests in individual behavior change
for public health benefit. As the importance of this type
of research is increasingly recognized, it is anticipated that
such guidance will be developed. According to Buchanan
and Miller (2006), “Taking a public health perspective on
research ethics is associated with broadening the concep-
tualisation of risk and benefits deemed ethically relevant
in deliberations on health research. To ascertain its social
value, a comprehensive analysis must take into account
not only the risks and benefits to the research participants
themselves but also the benefits and risks to the population
as a whole” (730). Childress and colleagues (2002) identify
five “justificatory conditions” (effectiveness, proportional-
ity, necessity, least infringement, and public justification)
useful for resolving conflicts between public health goals
and other ethical principles.
Effectiveness
Childress and colleagues (2002) suggest that evidence of
effectiveness is required to justify public health interven-
tions where they infringe on other moral considerations.
This implies that evidence in the form of publicly avail-
able data from rigorously conducted scientific studies has a
moral value in its own right, though the justification ismore
obvious for effectiveness studies than for methodological
research. These studies aim to provide data on the effective-
ness of interventions and to improve methods for the iden-
tification of biases that undermine the value of effectiveness
data. The use of deception permits the identification of these
biases. There is a moral argument for effectiveness research
(Kass 2001), and by extension for methodological research
that aims to enhance the validity of effectiveness data by
eliminating or controlling biases. This is because develop-
ments in intervention researchmethods, including those ob-
tained by using deception, offer potential to provide more
reliable and socially useful data, whichmay in turn bemore
widely used. This contribution of enhancedmethodological
rigor obviously needs to be considered carefully in relation
to the ethical risks inherent in using deception.
Proportionality
In relation to proportionality, both the risks and the benefits
to the individual may be fairly trivial. The study popula-
tion is judged relatively safe for doing this type of work,
being less likely to contain significant proportions of vul-
nerable people who may be discomforted, distressed, or
otherwise harmed by deception. There is some potential for
distress with the subject of alcohol being raised for some
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participants, as may occur outside the research context. Ex-
tensive and detailed pilot work has been done in a range
of earlier studies to refine the methods used, being vigilant
for adverse reactions (Hallett et al. 2009). We have focused
on the ethical concerns involved in infringing rights rather
than causing harm to participants, partly due to the lack
of obvious potential to engender significant harm and the
absence of such data in feedback.
Fisher and Fyrberg (1994) reported a study of 90 intro-
ductory psychology students who read reports incorporat-
ing a range of forms of deception in research. Their analyses
of responses indicated that approximately 70% of students
adopted a basically utilitarian attitude to what they had
read, and of the 30% who had what might be character-
ized as a Kantian approach, approximately 10% objected in
principle to the use of deception.
The principal health and social value of research of this
type lies in the benefits to be realized in populations if in-
terventions are found to be effective and widely delivered,
as well as to the extent that they contribute to our broader
understanding of drinking behavior and how it may be in-
fluenced. Future epidemics of alcohol-related problems are
entirely foreseeable, and thus preventable, in Sub-Saharan
Africa and in low- andmiddle-income countries elsewhere.
Intervention effectiveness research of this kind, to the extent
that it is successful in identifying effective interventions, as-
sists moral arguments for taking action. The extent to which
this type of rationale for the use of deception is justified de-
pends upon what exactly is being done.
Necessity
Whether we should not go beyond what is necessary in
infringingmoral considerations in research depends in part
upon the value of the information obtained in so doing.
If current information on brief alcohol interventions were
widely accepted as being sufficiently rigorous on which to
base decisions about what we as a society should do, then
thework that we are doingwould probably be unnecessary.
The implementation of brief interventions has been slow
in large measure because existing evidence and claims of
potential public health benefit have not been found to be
sufficiently compelling (Heather 2012). We thus believe this
work is necessary.
Least Infringement
According to the Nuffield Council Report on Public Health
Ethics (2007), “Individual consent is not always relevant or
appropriate when considering public health measures. For
example, individual consent might be unnecessary if the
measure is not very intrusive or if it prevents significant
harm to others . . . in particular where there is only a limited
degree of interference with individuals’ liberty and no sub-
stantial health risks” (3). The degree of intrusiveness is an
example of least infringement, identified by Childress and
colleagues (2002) as requiring justification.
If deception really is essential, could we reduce its ex-
tent, as participants may be expected to object more to be-
ing actively misled with false information than to having
information withheld? It is hypothetically possible that de-
ception could have been used differently in these studies in
order to minimize the infringement of rights. Two possible
alternatives have been suggested for this purpose, both of
which involve some permission being given for deception
to be used: (1) make the participants aware that they are
going to be misled or not fully informed in advance (autho-
rized deception;O’Neil andMiller 2009;Wendler andMiller
2004); or (2) have someone provide informed consent on
their behalf (consent by proxy; Bortolotti andMameli 2006).
Both possibilities are problematic to the extent that they
lack face validity for studies of this type. The former would
specifically draw attention to the conduct of the research
that the study is otherwise designed to deflect attention
away from (Fisher and Fyrberg 1994). This would prob-
ably evoke wariness among participants, interfering with
their engagement in the study. In this respect, our stud-
ies resemble social psychology experiments, whose designs
are informed by consideration of psychological responses,
moving the setting from the laboratory to the internet. A
key advantage of working in this way is that behavior is
not constrained by the artificial laboratory setting and the
research process can be unobtrusive, important considera-
tions for social andbehavioral sciences. The latter possibility
(proxy consent) would be so impractical on an individual
level that it could not be considered for implementation. Al-
though developmental work over the years has paid careful
attention to any issues raised, consulting with student bod-
ies might be useful to consider further as a form of proxy
consent at a population level.
Public Justification
In publishing this article we invite consideration of the eth-
ical issues raised by our own decisions, as well as about
any implied possibility of more widespread use of decep-
tion in research. The final condition requiring justification
identified by Childress and colleagues (2002) is public justi-
fication. This article offers a first step in a two-step process
where public justification within the research community is
a precursor to justification with the public. We have not yet
developed our thinking about how this might best be done.
FURTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR OUR APPROACH
The fully informed right to decide whether or not to par-
ticipate has been denied in the three trials comprising this
case study, involving an apparent diminution of respect for
persons (O’Neil and Miller 2009). Research participants are
also members of society and thus may gain from the soci-
etal value of the research being done, however small and
indirect this gain may be to them. The widely accepted, and
perhaps the only possible, justification for these infringe-
ments of rights and lack of respect lies in the social value of
the deceptive research and thus the possible consequences
of the research not being done, or not being done as well,
without deception (Brendel and Miller 2008; Wendler and
Miller 2004). It could be argued that giving toomuchweight
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to the views of research participants can itself be unethical
if it disadvantages the community as a whole by depriving
it of the most valid investigations of important issues. What
respect is shown to those people who suffer because of their
own or other people’s drinking if we forgo opportunities to
learn how to better prevent and deal with alcohol or other
public health problems? Such a concern is fundamental to
public health ethics. It is not of course being suggested that
this justifies anyuseofdeception, but rather that it is possible
to justify the particular forms of deception employed here
in this way. We suggest that it is unlikely in these studies
that participants will be harmed beyond the lack of respect
shown to them.
This should not, however, obscure that the use of decep-
tion unavoidably involves moral costs. Consider a world in
which there was much more deception than there is now
and ask whether this world is likely to be a better place.
Although it may be justified in certain circumstances, and
may produce moral benefits as well as moral costs, decep-
tion in research infringes on what are widely accepted as
rights that research participants should have (Brendel and
Miller 2008; Miller et al. 2008; O’Neil and Miller 2009). We
see deception in research as involving a trust violation by
those in a relatively powerful position (we researchers), in
relation to the people we want to study. This entails the in-
fringement of rights, and suggests the possibility that other
harms may emanate from deception. Although there may
be moral benefits consequent on the wider use of deception
in research imaginable, there would also be moral costs.
Bortolotti and Mameli (2006) identify both moral bene-
fits and costs in the use of deception, arising from an exam-
ination of the nature of autonomy. They describe examples
in relation to prejudices and other forms of personal biases
where the use of deception promotes the revelation of in-
sidious ways of thinking and the accrual of self-knowledge,
which serve to increase rather than decrease individual au-
tonomy. Being given opportunities to reflect upon one’s atti-
tude or behaviormay lead, they argue, tomore autonomous
behavior. Their conception of autonomy is one where it is
“not only about offering people the opportunity to make
their own independent decisions, but also about ensuring
that those who have this opportunity are aware of the rel-
evant factors that might affect their decisions” (Bortolotti
and Mameli 2006, 270). They recognize that such learning
or self-discoverymay be distressing, and that one should at-
tend carefully to the extent of any such distress, though they
point out that we as a society value education as a moral
good. If our studies encourage people to think a little bit
more about their behavior because they answer some ques-
tions about it when taking part, this moral benefit needs to
be considered, as well as the moral cost involved in getting
them to do this thinking without seeking their permission
for it. Our participants have given us data in the form of free
text feedback comments that could be useful in this regard.
Studies of university student participants generally sug-
gest that they do not mind taking part in deceptive stud-
ies and that there are not any obvious harms to so do-
ing (Fisher and Fyrberg 1994; Miller et al. 2008; Wendler
and Miller 2004). It is unknown, however, what may be
the nature and extent of harms to participants as a re-
sult of the use of deception in other research settings or
in other populations because this has not been well stud-
ied. As well as direct harms to participants, there is also
concern about the possible corruption of researchers where
the use of deception in a given study may cause less ethical
practice among researchers in other studies (Wendler and
Miller 2004). Such harmswould be difficult or impossible to
quantify.
This leaves us in the position of preferring to use de-
ception, for the reasons and in the ways we have described,
in a context and on a scale that we believe has not been
previously subjected to ethical scrutiny in the literature.
We have consulted formal guidance where it is available in
carefully developing the research methods over time, pay-
ing attention to feedback in our earlier studies that has not
revealed any issues of concern not covered here (Hallett
et al. 2009; Kypri et al. 2009; McCambridge and Day 2008).
We are struck by the limited coverage of these issues in the
various forms of existing guidance we have consulted. We
have gained ethical approval for the conduct of these stud-
ies andworked through these issues in teaching sessions on
public health research ethics and in more informal ways.
“PRAGMATISM” IN PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS
Our public health ethics approach to these issues shares
strong similarities with the approach of “pragmatism” in
clinical research ethics, “best understood not as a unique
method of ethical analysis or a systematic source of val-
idated ethical principles, but instead as a spirit of open
enquiry and practically focussed reasoning about ethical
dilemmas” (Brendel andMiller 2008, 25).Wediscovered this
approach in the literature when looking for helpful ways of
thinking about the difficult moral issues arising from us-
ing deception in research. It had obvious appeal for us,
as it both resembled a more coherent and well-articulated
example of how we had ourselves made sense of these is-
sues, and provided a guide to further thinking. Pragmatism
strives explicitly to balance the moral value of socially use-
ful research with moral responsibilities to research partic-
ipants. The protection of research participants during the
conduct of socially valuable research is framed as a prac-
tical problem, ultimately requiring judgments about which
reasonable people may disagree. It is essentially a problem-
solving case-studymethod, which applies ethical principles
as potentially useful instruments rather than as fixed rules
(Brendel and Miller 2008). It is certainly not implied that
our treatment of these issues represents the only possible
application of pragmatism.
This orientation to the likely consequences of acting or
not acting in a given way calls attention to the value of
empirical data in decision making, and experimental data
in particular (Brendel and Miller 2008). Miller and Wendler
(2006) suggest that empirical data are no substitute for eth-
ical reflection, though they undoubtedly can be an aid to it.
There are scant data on attitudes to deception in research in
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general, as well as in relation to specific study contexts such
as are considered here. Similarly, whether or not there exist
harms consequent on deception remains largely unknown
because of the lack of a tradition of empirical study. We see
much potential benefit in bringing together methodological
and ethical thinking, considering the ethical implications of
the findings of methodological studies and likewise consid-
ering the methodological implications of empirical studies
of ethical issues such as those already described. Surveys of
views on ethical issues among prospective participants in
research, for example, should not be difficult to undertake.
The Importance of Empirical Studies Investigating
Issues of Ethical Significance: Debriefing as an
Example
Debriefing, making participants aware of deception after
the event, is usually strongly recommended in all relevant
ethical guidance of which we are aware. In some cases rec-
ommendations on debriefing are qualified with “as appro-
priate” (O’Neil and Miller 2009) or in similar terms, and
the question of whether or not debriefing is beneficial re-
quires consideration in specific study contexts. One main
argument in favor of debriefing pertains to the rights and
respect deficit.While debriefing is not any formof retrospec-
tive informed consent, we agree with Miller and colleagues
(2008) that it serves a moral accountability function. An-
other argument is that it provides an opportunity for re-
search participants to make known their reactions (British
Psychological Society 2007). One counterargument is that
debriefing itself may cause distress, and for this reason in-
formation given is recommended to be constructed with
care to minimize this possibility (British Psychological Soci-
ety 2007). Another counterargument is that informing large
numbers of people that deception has been used may have
deleterious impacts on future participation in research, thus
diminishing the methodological rigor and hence the social
value of future research. We see no direct harms to our par-
ticipants consequent upon not debriefing and thus allowing
them to possess uncorrected beliefs about the nature of the
studies in which they took part, while in other studies this
may not be the case (O’Neil and Miller 2009).
We wished to explore how to actually implement de-
briefing in practice in large online trials and thus random-
ized all participants in the ESDA methodological Study C
(Kypri et al. 2011) to be debriefed in two different ways: (1)
with the debriefing information in the body of the e-mail
and additional information on study methods and results
available by clicking on links; and (2) making all this in-
formation available only by clicking on links. We measured
the proportions who clicked on the links and how long the
pages remained open. We found that the latter method ap-
proximately doubled the rates of clicking on the links to
study protocol and results respectively, though overall only
one quarter of this group clicked on any links (McCam-
bridge, Kypri, and Wilson 2012). These data provide a plat-
form for further investigations of implementing debriefing
online and inform ethical evaluation of this practice.
We invited participants in Study B, the AMADEUS-1
trial (McCambridge, Bendtsen, et al. 2012), to take part in
two focus-group interviews. In each we explored in-depth
reactions to being debriefed in person in the presence of
other participants, discussed the ethical issues addressed
here, and sought views on whether and how debriefing of
the remainder of the study populationmight take place. We
subsequentlydecided todebrief all trial participants, and re-
served the possibility that data could bewithdrawn if e-mail
correspondence revealed concerns that were not satisfacto-
rily resolved. Interestingly, the participants thought that this
option should not be made too easily available. The other
main finding concerned heightened distrust of research in-
vitations, and although this was interwoven with confiden-
tiality and privacy concerns about Internet use in general,
it suggested a paradoxical harm arising from, or accentu-
ated by, debriefing itself. There are obvious moral costs to
any actions inhibiting future participation in research. We
intend to think further about whether we should under-
take debriefing in future studies involving deception and
are considering not doing so. We anticipate not making any
such decision without further empirical studies.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The existing consensus is that deception may be used as a
last resort when there is no alternative to not using it in or-
der to obtain required data of a methodologically rigorous
standard. Rather than being a last resort, some degree of
deception appears more an essential prerequisite to doing
methodological research of the type presented here and also
to be useful in evaluations of behavioral interventions that
exert small effects and are vulnerable to biases associated
with research participation. These small effects on behav-
iors are, nonetheless, important to know about as we try
to find better ways to deal with alcohol and other health
compromising behaviors. Using the Internet to do research
on large numbers of people in this way means the potential
for deception is likely to grow. This public health context
changes the ways in which the moral costs and benefits of
deception are weighed up but does not remove the moral
costs.
The use of deception in public health intervention re-
search and elsewhere, in our view, thus should be treated
with skepticism on ethical grounds. It should not, how-
ever, be rejected out of hand. Its possible use should be
considered carefully by ethical committees, paying close at-
tention to study context. If it is judged useful or necessary
to produce more valid inferences, the moral costs involved
in obtaining such data need to be considered in relation to
the moral benefits that the data may produce, which are in
turn contingent upon the scientific and social value of the
research. Evaluation of the costs and benefits will be en-
hanced by empirical data. We recognize that one possible
consequence of our own openness to deception, and any fa-
vorable attention to the issues raised here, is that there may
bemore of it. We thus see it as raising obligations, which we
are happy to accept, that the use of deception in research
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should be accompanied by empirical studies to inform ethi-
cal decision making and that there should be both scientific
debate and public justification. 
REFERENCES
Barchard, K. A., and J. Williams. 2008. Practical advice for conduct-
ing ethical online experiments and questionnaires for United States
psychologists. Behavioral Research Methods 40: 1111–1128.
Bortolotti, L., andM.Mameli. 2006.Deception in psychology:Moral
costs and benefits of unsought self-knowledge. Accountability in
Research 13: 259–275.
Boutron, I., L. Guittet, C. Estellat, D. Moher, A. Hro´bjartsson, and P.
Ravaud. 2007. Reporting methods of blinding in randomized trials
assessing nonpharmalogical treatments. PLoS Medicine 4: e61.
Brendel, D. H., and F. G. Miller. 2008. A plea for pragmatism in
clinical research ethics. American Journal of Bioethics 8: 24–31.
British Psychological Society. 2007. Report of the Working Party on
Conducting Reseach on the Internet: Guidelines for ethical practice
in psychological research online. Available at: http://www.
bps.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/conducting research
on the internet-guidelines for ethical practice in psychological
research online.pdf (accessed March 1, 2012).
Buchanan, D. R., and F. G. Miller. 2006. A public health perspective
on research ethics. Journal of Medical Ethics 32: 729–733.
Bulmer, M. 1982. Are pseudo-patient studies justified? Journal of
Medical Ethics 8: 65–71.
Burger, J. M. 2009. Replicating Milgram: Would people still obey
today? American Psychologist 64: 1–11.
Carson, C. F., D. W. Smith, G. J. Lampacher, and T. V. Riley. 2008.
Use of deception to achieve double-blinding in a clinical trial of
Melaleuca alternifolia (tea tree) oil for the treatment of recurrent her-
pes labialis. Contemporary Clinical Trials, 29: 9–12.
Cave, E., and S. Holm. 2003. Milgram and Tuskegee—Paradigm
research projects in bioethics. Health Care Analysis 11: 27–40.
Chick, J., G. Lloyd, and E. Crombie. 1985. Counselling problem
drinkers in medical wards: A controlled study. British Medical Jour-
nal 290: 965–967.
Childress, J. F., R. R. Faden, R. D. Gaare, et al. 2002. Public health
ethics: Mapping the terrain. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 30:
170–178.
Clifford, P. R., and S. A. Maisto. 2000. Subject reactivity effects and
alcohol treatment outcome research. Journal of Studies on Alcohol 61:
787–793.
Fisher, C. B., and D. Fyrberg. 1994. Participant partners—College-
students weigh the costs and benefits of deceptive research. Amer-
ican Psychologist 49: 417–427.
Fleming, M. F., K. L. Barry, L. B. Manwell, K. Johnson, and R.
London. 1997. Brief physician advice for problem alcohol drinkers:
A randomized controlled trial in community-based primary care
practices. Journal of the American Medical Association 277: 1039–1045.
Fleming, M. F., M. Bruno, K. Barry, and N. Fost. 1989. Informed
consent, deception, and the use of disguised alcohol questionnaires.
American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse 15: 309–319.
Hallett, J., B. Maycock, K. Kypri, P. Howat, and A. McManus. 2009.
Development of a Web-based alcohol intervention for university
students: Processes and challenges. Drug and Alcohol Review 28:
31–39.
Heather, N. 2010. Breaking new ground in the study and practice
of alcohol brief interventions. Drug and Alcohol Review 29: 584–
588.
Heather, N. 2012. Can screening and brief intervention lead to
population-level reductions in alcohol-related harm? Addiction Sci-
ence & Clinical Practice 7: 15.
Higgins, J. P. T., D. G. Altman, J. A. C. Sterne, on behalf of the
Cochrane Statistical Methods Group and the Cochrane Bias Meth-
ods Group. 2011. Chapter 8: Assessing risk of bias in included
studies. In HIGGINS, J. P. T., GREEN, S. (ed.) Cochrane Handbook for
Systematic Reviews of Interventions Version 5.1.0, ed. J. P. T. Higgins
and S. Green (updated March 2011). The Cochrane Collaboration.
Available at: www.cochrane-handbook.org
Jenkins, R. J., J. McAlaney, and J. McCambridge. 2009. Change over
time in alcohol consumption in control groups in brief intervention
studies: Systematic review and meta-regression study. Drug and
Alcohol Dependency 100: 107–114.
Jenkins, R. J., J. McAlaney, and J. McCambridge. 2010. Change over
time in alcohol consumption in control groups in brief intervention
studies: Systematic review and meta-regression study (vol 100, pg
107, 2009). Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 108: 151.
Kass, N. E. 2001. An ethics framework for public health. American
Journal of Public Health 91: 1776–1782.
Kirschner, K., J. Braspenning, I. Maassen, A. Bonte, J. Burgers, and
R. Grol. 2010. Improving access to primary care: The impact of a
quality-improvement strategy. Quality & Safety in Health Care 19:
248–251.
Krebs, J. 2008. The importance of public-health ethics. Bulletin of the
World Health Organization 86: 579.
Kypri, K., J. Hallett, P. Howat, A. McManus, B. Maycock, S. Bowe,
and N. J. Horton. 2009. Randomized controlled trial of proactive
web-based alcohol screening and brief intervention for university
students. Archives of Internal Medicine 169: 1508–1514.
Kypri, K., J. McCambridge, J. A. Cunningham, et al. 2010. Web-
based alcohol screening and brief intervention for Maori and non-
Maori: The New Zealand e-SBINZ trials. BMC Public Health 10: 781.
Kypri, K., J. McCambridge, T. Vater, et al. 2013. Web-based alcohol
intervention forMaori university students:Double-blind,multi-site
randomised controlled trial. Addiction 108: 331–338.
Kypri, K., J. McCambridge, A. Wilson, et al. 2011. Effects of Study
Design and Allocation on participant behavior—ESDA: Study pro-
tocol for a randomized controlled trial. Trials 12: 42.
Laney,C., S.O.Kaasa, E. K.Morris, S. R. Berkowitz,D.M. Bernstein,
and E. F. Loftus. 2008. The red herring technique: Amethodological
response to the problem of demand characteristics. Psychological
Research 72: 362–375.
Lenza, M. 2004. Controversies surrounding Laud Humphreys’
tearoom trade: An unsettling example of politics and power in
methodological critiques. International Journal of Sociology and Social
Policy 24: 20–31.
46 ajob November, Volume 13, Number 11, 2013
Deception in Behavioral Intervention Trials
Lim, S. S., T. Vos, A. D. Flaxman, et al. 2012. A comparative risk
assessment of burden of disease and injury attributable to 67 risk
factors and risk factor clusters in 21 regions, 1990–2010: A system-
atic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010. Lancet
380: 2224–2260.
Linke, S., J. McCambridge, Z. Khadjesari, P. Wallace, and E. Mur-
ray. 2008. Development of a psychologically enhanced interactive
online intervention for hazardous drinking. Alcohol and Alcoholism
43: 669–674.
Marteau, T. M., R. E. Ashcroft, and A. Oliver. 2009. Using financial
incentives to achieve healthy behaviour. British Medical Journal 338:
b1415.
Marteau, T. M., A. Oliver, and R. E. Ashcroft. 2008. Changing
behaviour through state intervention. British Medical Journal 337:
a2543.
McCambridge, J., P. Bendtsen, M. Bendtsen, and P. Nilsen. 2012.
Alcohol email assessment and feedback study dismantling effec-
tiveness for university students (AMADEUS-1): Study protocol for
a randomized controlled trial. Trials 13: 49.
McCambridge, J., K. Butor-Bhavsar, J. Witton, and D. Elbourne.
2011. Can research assessments themselves cause bias in behaviour
change trials? A systematic review of evidence from Solomon 4-
group studies. PLoS ONE 6: e25223.
McCambridge, J., andM. Day. 2008. Randomized controlled trial of
the effects of completing the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification
Test questionnaire on self-reported hazardous drinking. Addiction
103: 241–248.
McCambridge, J., M. De Bruin, and J. Witton. 2012. The effects of
demand characteristics on research participant behaviours in non-
laboratory settings: A systematic review. PLoS ONE 7: e39116.
McCambridge, J., and K. Kypri. 2011. Can simply answering
research questions change behaviour? Systematic review and
meta analyses of brief alcohol intervention trials. PLoS One 6:
e23748.
McCambridge, J., K. Kypri, and A. Wilson. 2012. How should de-
briefing be undertaken in web-based studies? Findings from a ran-
domised controlled trial. Journal ofMedical Internet Research 14: e157.
Miller, F. G., J. P. Gluck, Jr., andD.Wendler. 2008. Debriefing and ac-
countability in deceptive research.Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
18: 235–251.
Miller, F. G., and D. Wendler. 2006. The relevance of empirical
research in bioethics. Schizophrenia Bulletin 32: 37–41.
NuffieldCouncil on Bioethics. 2007.Public health: Ethical issues.Lon-
don, UK: Nuffield Council on Bioethics.
O’Neil, C. C., and F. G. Miller. 2009. When scientists deceive: Ap-
plying the federal regulations. Journal of Law,Medicine and Ethics 37:
344–350.
Office for Human Research Protections. 1993. Basic IRB review.
Institutional Review Board Guidebook, chap. 3. Available at: http://
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb chapter3.htm#e2
Rachels, J. 1999. The elements of moral philosophy (3rd ed.). Boston,
MA: McGraw-Hill College.
Rehm, J., C. Mathers, S. Popova, M. Thavorncharoensap, Y. Teer-
awattananon, and J. Patra. 2009. Global burden of disease and in-
jury and economic cost attributable to alcohol use and alcohol-use
disorders. Lancet 373: 2223–2233.
Room, R., T. Babor, and J. Rehm. 2005. Alcohol and public health.
Lancet 365: 519–530.
Rosenhan, D. L. 1973. On being sane in insane places. Science 179:
250–258.
Rosnow, R. L., and R. Rosenthal. 1997. People studying people: Arti-
facts and ethics in behavioral research. New York, NY: Freeman.
Sarantakos, S. 2005. Social research. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Sharkey, S., R. Jones, J. Smithson, et al. 2011. Ethical practice in
internet research involving vulnerable people: Lessons from a self-
harm discussion forum study (SharpTalk). Journal of Medical Ethics
37: 752–728.
Spitzer, R. L. 1975. On pseudoscience in science, logic in remis-
sion, and psychiatric diagnosis: A critique of Rosenhan’s “On be-
ing sane in insane places.” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 84: 442–
452.
Wallace, P., S. Cutler, and A. Haines. 1988. Randomised controlled
trial of general practitioner intervention in patients with excessive
alcohol consumption. British Medical Journal 297: 663–668.
Wendler, D., and F. G. Miller. 2004. Deception in the pursuit of
science. Archives of Internal Medicine 164: 597–600.
Whitehead, L. C. 2007. Methodological and ethical issues in
Internet-mediated research in the field of health: an integrated re-
view of the literature. Social Science & Medicine 65: 782–791.
WHO Brief Intervention Study Group. 1996. A cross-national trial
of brief interventionswith heavydrinkers.American Journal of Public
Health 86: 948–955.
Williams, J. R. 2008. The Declaration of Helsinki and public health.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 86: 650–652.
Wong, M. L., R. Chan, H. H. Tan, et al. 2012. Sex work and risky
sexual behaviors among foreign entertainment workers in urban
Singapore: Findings from mystery client survey. Journal of Urban
Health 89: 1031–1044.
World Medical Association. 2008. World Medical Association Dec-
laration of Helsinki: Ethical principles for medical research in-
volving human subjects. Available at: http://www.wma.net/en/
30publications/10policies/b3/ (accessed September 30, 2013).
November, Volume 13, Number 11, 2013 ajob 47
